Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave? by Bittlingmayer, George
DID ANTITRUST POLICY CAUSE THE 
GREAT MERGER WAVE?* 
GEORGE BITTLINGMA YER 
Washington University 
I . INTRODUCTION 
PERHAPS as much as one-half of U.S. manufacturing capacity took part 
in mergers during the years 1898 to 1902. These mergers frequently in-
cluded most of the firms in an industry and often involved firms that had 
been fixing prices or that had been operated jointly through the legal 
mechanism of an industrial trust. The histories of Standard Oil and U.S. 
Steel provide well-known instances in which merger followed looser 
forms of organization in what has come to be known as the Great Merger 
Wave . What caused this rapid change of industry structure? The Sherman 
Antitrust Act was passed in 1890, and the first crucial decisions making 
price fixing illegal—Trans-Missouri (1897), Joint Traffic (1898), and Ad-
dyston (1899)—occurred just before or during the first stages of the mer-
ger wave . 1 Merger of competing firms remained unchallenged until 1904. 
Although it certainly seems plausible that antitrust policy caused the 
Great Merger Wave, the question has never been looked into at length, 
and some influential studies of the mergers and of early antitrust policy 
play down the possibility of a connection. This is puzzling because the 
search for alternatives has not borne fruit. One reason economists may be 
* A conversa t ion with Lester Teiser led me to write this paper, and his comments have 
p r o v e d to be a great aid. I thank Yale Brozen, Meyer Burstein, Alfred Chandler, Nolan Clark, 
F r a n k Eas t e rb rook , Michael Knoll , Naomi Lamoreaux , William Landes , John Martin, 
F r e d e r i c k Miller, Edward Snyder, Barry Weingast, and an anonymous referee for useful 
c o m m e n t s and suggestions. My expressions of gratitude should not be taken to imply, 
h o w e v e r , that those who have helped me necessarily agree with my methods or conclusions. 
K e v i n Sullivan provided expert research assis tance. This work was supported in part 
t h r o u g h the summer grant program of the Graduate School of Business Administrat ion of the 
U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan. 
1 Un i t ed Sta tes v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass 'n , 166 U.S . 290 (1897); United States v. 
Jo in t Traffic Ass 'n , 171 U . S . 505 (1898); and United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. , 
175 U . S . 211 (1899). Judge William Howard Taft 's Court of Appeals opinion, U .S . v. 
A d d y s t o n , 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), a f f d , was also influential, as I show below. 
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inclined to dismiss the influence of cartel policy, and why the possibility 
has never been pressed, comes from the presumption that firms would 
choose merger over price fixing if they could because merger avoids a 
host of problems that cartels face. Why should monopoly-minded firms 
have to be forced to merge at the point of a bayonet? The answer, of 
course, is that firms will prefer cartels to merger if the gains are greater. If 
there are diseconomies from merger and if the available monopoly gains 
are not large, the preferred choice may very well be cartelization, making 
it at least conceivable that the introduction of a law against price fixing 
swung the balance in favor of merger. 
This argument assumes that the motive for both cartels and mergers is 
monopoly gain. However, the idea that the motive may not be monopoly 
at all also seems worth exploring, especially since many firms seemed to 
prefer the vagaries of a cartel agreement to the more secure coordination 
of a merged existence. For example, cartels and mergers may be coopera-
tive attempts to solve market problems that do not have a noncooperative 
solution. One focus of such an explanation, and the one that I will empha-
size, is the integer or fixed-cost problem. This is a well-known instance in 
which there is no competitive equilibrium. As always, the choice between 
two theories should be governed by their ability to explain the facts, and I 
hope to show that an explanation based on the desire to remedy the 
problems posed by fixed costs has at least as much going for it in the case 
of the Great Merger Wave as an explanation based on simple greed. 
I should emphasize that these two explanations, alone or together, do 
not provide a general theory of merger; there are certainly reasons other 
than a desire for monopoly gain or a desire to remedy market failure 
stemming from fixed costs why firms might merge. My primary aim is to 
see whether a reasonable theoretical foundation can be constructed for 
the view that changes in antitrust policy caused the large year-to-year 
variations in merger activity that took place in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries and that converted many cartels to single-firm 
organization. This paper is not an attempt to explain horizontal mergers in 
general, and I do not rule out the possibility that something like U.S. Steel 
would have been formed eventually even if the antitrust laws had never 
been passed. 
This study is organized as follows: Section II reviews two explanations 
for cartels and merger and summarizes their implications for the organiza-
tion of an industry. Section III covers developments in turn-of-the-
century antitrust policy, and Section IV presents data on the U.S. and 
U.K. mergers. Section V looks at two prominent industries that partici-
pated in the 1898-1902 merger wave—railroading and iron and steel—and 
reviews evidence from several other industries where there seems to have 
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been a link between antitrust and merger. Section VI considers the objec-
tions that have been raised against the existence of such a link, and 
Section VII looks at the possibility of a connection between antitrust and 
merger for the period 1905-50. It also contains a statistical investigation 
for the years 1895-1920 of the relation among merger, antitrust policy, 
and stock prices. 
I I . MONOPOLY, COLLUSION, AND INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION 
The familiar explanation for cartels and anticompetitive mergers be-
gins, at least implicitly, with the analysis of competitive markets and 
emphasizes the gains from competition. Competition between firms 
brings prices down to marginal cost, and the entry and exit of firms leads 
to prices that cover the costs of the marginal firm in the long run. It is 
useful to recall two of the key assumptions in this analysis: average costs 
of the firm decrease to a certain point and then increase, and the number 
of firms is " l a r g e . " If the firms in an industry can get together and form a 
cartel or merge, they may be able to restrict output and raise prices at the 
expense of the consumer. 
The analysis of cartels has focused on the costs and benefits of collu-
sion, often as a subtopic in the economics of information. Ultimately, of 
course, an increase in price will lead to new entry, but short of provoking 
new entry , the gains accruing to monopoly-minded producers are limited 
by the difficulty of agreeing on a division of the profits and of detecting 
cheating and enforcing collusion. 2 In particular, the fewer the number of 
sellers in an industry, the easier it is for them to collude. It should be 
noted, however , that there is a certain tension or inconsistency between 
the assumption of large numbers of firms in the model of competition used 
as a benchmark and the result that collusion is more likely when the 
number of firms is small. Various other factors linked with the difficulty or 
ease of collusion have also been mentioned, but the number of firms 
appears on every list. 3 
2 T h e pa th -break ing analysis of George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, in The Organi-
za t ion of Indus t ry 39 (1968), substi tuted the calculus of self-interest for boot-strap explana-
t ions of col lus ion. 
3 G e o r g e J. Stigler, The Theory of Price 219-20 (2d ed. 1966), cites several factors that 
m a k e fo rming and policing agreements more difficult: more numerous firms, a more complex 
p r o d u c t m a r k e t , and more rapid changes in supply and demand. Frederic M. Scherer , 
Indus t r i a l M a r k e t S t ruc ture and Economic Performance 199-200 (1980), also places empha-
sis o n t h e n u m b e r of compet i to rs . Richard A. Posner & Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust 
3 3 6 - 3 8 (2d ed. 1981), list twelve facilitating factors. (Although their preceding discussion 
c o n c e r n s " t a c i t co l lus ion , " their list appears to apply to collusion in general.) Of these 
t w e l v e , e ight a re conce rned with the problem of detecting cheating and enforcing collusion. 
T h e s e e igh t a re seller concent ra t ion , the existence of a competit ive fringe, buyer concentra-
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It might seem from this sketch of models of collusion that the firms in an 
i n d u s t r y bent on getting monopoly gain will prefer merger to price fixing 
b e c a u s e cartels often break down and because the costs of agreeing on a 
d iv i s ion of prospective monopoly gains are incurred only once, while 
ca r t e l enforcement costs are a recurring expense. This is a natural suppo-
s i t ion , and attempts to explain the turn-of-the-century mergers in many 
ca r t e l i zed industries have focused on developments that made it easier 
t o c r e a t e and operate large firms—changes in corporation law, im-
p r o v e m e n t s in communication and transportation, and the growth of orga-
n i z e d exchanges—instead of changes that raised the costs of carteliza-
t i o n . 4 However, the emphasis on factors that facilitated the formation of 
l a rge firms may still be wrong if the diseconomies or other costs associ-
a t e d wi th merger are sufficiently large and if the prospective monopoly 
g a i n s a re small. 
F o r example, suppose that a monopolistically inclined industry faces 
ine las t ic demand up to a certain price and infinitely elastic foreign or 
po ten t i a l competition above that price. Also assume that there are some, 
p e r h a p s only slight, diseconomies from merger. 5 This is a simple model: 
t h e profit-maximizing price for both the cartel and the merged firm will be 
j u s t be low the import price even if the merged firm's costs are higher. But 
c o n s i d e r the implications. If the cartel breaks down 50 percent of the 
t i m e , the industry will remain a cartel only if the incremental costs of 
m e r g e r (per time period) are more than one-half the current monopoly 
ga in . Th i s implies either substantial diseconomies of scale or fairly effec-
t ive potential competition. For a given cost penalty from merger, the 
inc remen ta l gain from cartelization over merger increases as the durabil-
i ty of the cartel increases and as the cartel's current margin decreases. 
F o r s o m e combination of low-enough monopoly returns and high-enough 
c o s t penalties from merger, cartels will be preferred. 6 In short, there is 
t i o n , s t andard iza t ion of the product , the degree of heterogeneity in vertical integration 
a c r o s s firms, whether nonprice competition is important, the variability of demand, and the 
u s e o f s e a l e d bids. 
4 T h e l i te ra ture on this subject is discussed in Section VI below. 
5 T h e s e assumptions constitute a modification of those employed in George J. Stigler, 
M o n o p o l y a n d Oligopoly by Merger, in The Organization of Industry 95 (1968), which 
a s s u m e s n o diseconomies from merger and a less than instantaneous supply response to 
p r i c e s a b o v e the competitive level. 
6 L e t P b e the price above which the cartel or merged firm faces competition, C the 
c o n s t a n t u n i t costs of the cartel, M the constant unit costs of the merged firm, and x the 
p r o b a b i l i t y t ha t the cartel will function in a given period. The expected gains to merger per 
u n i t o f o u t p u t each period are P - M - x(P - C), assuming that the cartel jus t covers cos t s 
w h e n it b r e a k s down. Clearly, these gains are directly related to the monopoly margin and 
i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d to the durability of the cartel and the cartel margin. Specifically, the car te l 
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nothing inherently suspicious about a world in which firms prefer cartels 
to merger as a way of extracting monopoly rents and in which the enforce-
ment of a law against price fixing leads those firms to merge. 
So far, I have assumed that the aim of cartels and merger is monopoly 
profit, but there is another explanation that seems worth pursuing for two 
reasons. First, it avoids the inconsistency between the assumption of 
large numbers of competitors in the theory of competition and the result 
that collusion is manageable only with small numbers of competitors. In 
other words, the possibility of competition is no longer to be assumed but 
deduced. Second, it provides testable implications about the circum-
stances under which collusion will take place and the forms that collusion 
assumes, and these implications differ in some respects from those of-
fered in the more familiar theory. 
The strategy here is to make necessary and reasonable assumptions 
about the technology and demand of a market and then try to infer what 
will happen under a regime of competition and independent action. This 
leads very quickly to a well-known impasse in oligopoly and game theory, 
but it serves to illustrate that the problems actually faced by firms may be 
more complicated than the model of competition implies. I could present 
technical results on this point, but the first-time reader will probably get 
more out of an example. The proposed solution to the impasse is a 
cooperative equilibrium, and although I will not specify the allocation of 
returns in that equilibrium, I will propose that certain economic institu-
tions—cartels, merged firms, tacit collusion (if it exists), and government 
regulation—may constitute such cooperative outcomes. 
Suppose three mutual strangers are hailing cabs at a street corner, and 
all three want to get to the airport. Each is willing to pay $7. Two (unreg-
ulated) cabs, each assumed to have capacity for two passengers, show up 
at the same time. Each cabbie is willing to drive to the airport for $6 with 
either one or two passengers. The marginal cost of carrying the second 
passenger is zero, the three passengers are jointly willing to pay $21, and 
the cost of two cabs is $12. The optimal solution calls for both cabs to go, 
implying a net social gain of $9. 
One way to explore this situation is to set up a competitive algorithm— 
a set of rules that embody the notion of competition and independent 
act ion—and then trace the consequences. The purpose of this algorithm, 
it should be stressed, is not to offer a prediction of what will happen in 
such situations, but to illustrate that there is no competitive allocation of 
will be prefer red if P - M < x{P - C) o r P - C < (Af - C)/(l - x), where P ~ C is the 
car te l margin and M - C is the pe r unit cost penalty from merger. A law against cartels can 
be though t of as raising C and lowering x. 
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returns to cabbies and prospective passengers. Assume that cabbies pro-
pose fares, passengers can accept or reject those proposals, and that 
proposals are not binding until all are convinced that no alternative pro-
posal offers a superior outcome. If one cabbie proposes a fare of $5.00, 
the other would find it in his interest to offer, say, $4.50. This competition 
would continue until the offers reached $3.00, and one cabbie dropped 
out. The winner in this bidding contest could then raise his price to the 
profit-maximizing $7.00 which would allocate seats among the customers. 
But this would pull the loser back into the market, returning us to the 
beginning. 
Another way of illuminating the difficulty for competition, one that 
avoids what may be the counterintuitive notion of seemingly endless re-
contracting, is to focus on the returns available to passengers and cabbies. 
The obstacle to a competitive outcome is that while the "bes t " solution 
from the point of view of any two passengers and one cabbie provides the 
highest average returns available, all cabbies and all passengers cannot 
obtain these returns. For example, the maximum return available to the 
three passengers is $9, or $3 each. Equal returns to the passengers could 
come about if all three passengers bargain collectively, but any two al-
ways have an incentive to band together and hire an idle cab, assuring 
themselves as much as $4 surplus each. 
The difficulty posed in this example shows up under a wide range of 
cost and demand conditions and has been in the literature for at least fifty 
years. 7 Jacob Viner was led by "pseudo-dynamics" similar to those in the 
7 More general theoretical s tatements of this issue, based on the theory of the co re , 
appear in Les ter G. Teiser, Economic Theory and the Core (1978), ch. 2; William W . 
Sharkey, A Study of Markets Involving Increasing Returns and Uncertain Demand (1973) 
(unpublished Ph .D . dissertation, Univ. Chicago); and id., The Theory of Natural Monopoly 
(1983), ch. 6. Sharkey interprets the results in this last reference as an instance of " d e s t r u c -
tive competi t ion. ' 1 I t race some of the intellectual history of the problem of fixed costs in 
George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at t h e 
Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J. Law & Econ. 201, 204-10 (1982); and in id., Price Fixing and t h e 
Addyston Pipe Case, 5 Research in Law and Econ. 57, 122-23 nn .5-10 (1983). The integer 
problem can emerge because of uncertain and variable demand and because larger p roduc -
tion units have lower average costs than smaller units beyond some minimal capaci ty that is 
" l a r g e " relative to the market . So, in the example above, if three passengers showed u p 
together in every market period, cabs serving that street corner would have seats for t h ree 
passengers, with average costs presumably no higher than for cabs with only two sea t s . Wi th 
contestability, the price charged would result in revenues that jus t cover costs . On the o the r 
hand, if cabs with one seat had the same costs per passenger as larger cabs , all cabs could 
have one seat and there would be no integer problem regardless of how many passenge r s 
showed up. It is true that the integer problem disappears if plants have " f l a t -bo t tomed" 
average cost curves . William J. Baumol, John C. Panzar, & Robert D . Willig, Con tes t ab le 
Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure 32-40 (1982), justify the use of this a s s u m p -
tion by an appeal to the empirical results of Joe S. Bain, Economies of Scale, Concen t ra t ion 
and Entry , 44 A m . Econ . Rev. 15 (1954), and findings presented in Scherer, supra no te 3, c h . 
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bargaining rounds described above to conclude that prices in an industry 
wi th U-shaped average cost curves would oscillate. 8 Other results are also 
conceivable . The Cournot-Nash equilibrium calls for each cabbie to offer 
t h e number of seats that provides the most profit, acting under the as-
sumpt ion that the other driver does not react to the first driver's actions. 
E a c h driver would offer one seat. (If passengers were divisible, each 
would offer 1.49 seats.) Although this seems possible, it is hardly inevita-
b le . 
Instead of looking for a noncooperative or competitive equilibrium, it 
may be useful to think of this situation as one in which a cooperative 
solution can be employed. There are several possibilities. In the example 
he re , the passengers could present a united front to the two cabbies and 
split the surplus between them. As an alternative, the cabbies could agree 
t o charge $7 per passenger and split the resulting profit of $9 between 
them. The cabs could also merge. Yet another possibility calls for the city 
government to issue rate regulations, stipulating a fare of, say, $6 per 
passenger . This would not determine a unique allocation, but if an arbi-
trary criterion (a cab ' s distance from the curb) is used to settle which cab 
takes two passengers and which takes one, it would prevent the bargain-
ing impasse and result in an allocation that is as good as any other. In 
similar examples involving larger capacities and more prospective passen-
gers , price regulation and essentially random assignments would result in 
roughly equal numbers of passengers in each cab. 
The structure of the problem is not rich enough to determine what 
institutional arrangement will emerge, but it is clear that the transactions 
costs involved in various alternatives will have a major influence. 9 The 
4. H o w e v e r , t h e s e resu l t s refer to long-run economies , and they do not rule out by any 
m e a n s e c o n o m i e s o v e r a substant ia l range, the effect of which is to create 1 ' gaps ' ' in the 
s h o r t - r u n supp ly c u r v e . T h e possibility of flat-bottomed long-run average cost curves seems 
to m e t o b e of l imited re levance to the question whether the integer problem is important 
empi r ica l ly for sho r t - run equil ibria. For a different picture of the na ture of costs than is 
impl ied by the s u r v i v o r principle, see J. Maurice Clark, Studies in the Economics of Over-
h e a d C o s t s (1923); a n d the survey by A. A. Walters , Production and Cost Functions, 31 
E c o n o m e t r i c a 1 (1963). N o t e that with uncertain demand and transportation costs , the 
impl i ca t ions of t he su rv ivor principle do not hold since it becomes economical to maintain 
smal l c o s t l y p l a n t s . 
8 J a c o b Viner , C o s t Curves and Supply Curves , in Readings in Price Theory 198, 212 
( G e o r g e J . St igler & K e n n e t h Boulding eds . 1952). 
9 T h e i m p o r t a n c e of t ransac t ions costs in overcoming the problem of an empty core is 
n o t e d in R o n a l d C o a s e ' s c o m m e n t on Varouj A. Aivazian & Jeffrey L . Callen, The Coase 
T h e o r e m a n d the E m p t y C o r e , 24 J. L a w & Econ . 175 (1981). Aivazian and Callen present a 
ba rga in ing s i tua t ion similar to the one presented above. Both their case and mine have an 
e m p t y c o r e . T h e y u s e the pedagogical device of successive contracts to illustrate that no 
c o m p e t i t i v e so lu t ion emerges , and they conclude that " t h e nonexistence of the core fur-
n i s h e s y e t a fu r the r ra t ionale for the existence of particular contractual a r rangements . ' ' id. at 
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turnover of passengers may be high, ruling out collusion among passen-
gers. On the other hand, a small and stable population of cab drivers could 
allow successful self-regulation or merger. If joint action by passengers or 
cabbies failed, or if the resulting prices were in excess of costs, govern-
ment might step in. Of course, government might interfere anyway, and 
there is no guarantee that interference on legitimate grounds would be 
better than the evil aimed at. So, while the problem generated by fixed 
costs can be thought of as creating a fc'natural monopoly," in the sense 
that independent action and the price system do not lead to the optimal 
result, it is not clear that the ideal solution calls for either one firm or 
government regulation. 
This discussion can be interpreted in terms of the theory of the firm. 
When the problems of economic organization cannot be handled by the 
price system, the response is often the establishment of an organization 
that substitutes command for independence and the use of prices. This is 
what typically occurs within individual plants or production units, al-
though the difficulty of using the price system in organizing production 
often leads firms to encompass more than one plant. But just as competi-
tion within prescribed limits encourages efficiency within a firm, coopera-
tion can be useful among firms when the price system cannot ensure 
efficient outcomes. So, although efficient economic organization requires 
a mix of competition and cooperation, the two types of organization are 
not in one-to-one correspondence with markets and firms. 
In keeping with this view, the difficulty associated with fixed costs can 
be thought of as one variety of market failure that requires a partial 
suppression of independence and the competitive mechanism. Agree-
ments among plants, a type of self-regulation in other words, and merger 
are two ways of accomplishing this. Since individual discretion and re-
sponsibility in many aspects of a plant's operations may still be desirable 
even if fixed costs make a neoclassical competitive equilibrium impos-
sible, the least-cost solution could be the formation of a horizontal agree-
ment instead of a consolidated firm. In this respect a cartel resembles a 
franchise agreement, which also employs a combination of restriction and 
181. I would add that arrangements not enforced by a court of law may also r ep re sen t 
solutions to an empty core and that the relative costs of various arrangements will d e t e r m i n e 
which one is used. As Coase observes : "While consideration of what would happen in a 
world of ze ro transactions costs can give us valuable insights, these insights are , in my v i ew , 
without value except as steps on the way to the analysis of the real world of pos i t ive 
t ransact ion c o s t s . " Ronald H. Coase , The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core : A C o m -
ment , 24 J . Law & Econ. 183, 187 (1981). The distance between Coase and Aivaz ian and 
Callen m a y be less than their exchange implies. The difficulty illuminated by an empty c o r e 
points to a genuine problem in the real world, but how this difficulty is resolved u n d o u b t e d l y 
depends on particular c i rcumstances . 
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freedom. The analogy is even closer when the terms of operation of 
individual franchises are governed by all franchise holders acting collec-
tively. Not surprisingly, professional sports leagues look like monopo-
listic cartels at first glance. The limits to exploitation from such coopera-
tive agreements, it should go without saying, are determined by potential 
competition, and the possibility of buyers integrating vertically or acting 
jo in t ly . 1 0 
The market failure story has the following implications for the turn-of-
the-century merger wave. In the absence of legal restrictions, firms pre-
ferred cartelization because this was the cheaper way of organizing their 
industries. This may be particularly true of cyclical industries where ordi-
nary market frictions make it possible to recover costs during periods of 
high demand and in which the integer problem requires a cooperative 
effort only sporadically. However, when antitrust laws raised the costs of 
institutions that facilitated cooperation, horizontal merger often became 
the best available option. Sometimes firms also turned to vertical mergers 
since the market failure generated by fixed costs can be remedied by 
horizontal agreement, horizontal merger, long-term contracts (vertical 
price fixing in effect), or vertical merger, with the choice governed by the 
relevant costs and benefits. 
The monopoly explanation and the market failure explanations differ in 
some but not all of their implications. Both predict collusion when the 
number of firms in the relevant market is small, but only if the cost 
savings from remaining a cartel outweigh the incremental gains in revenue 
available under single-firm monopoly. Otherwise, the firms would have 
been merged already. Given the apparently small diseconomies from mer-
ger implied by the survivor principle, this suggests, under the monopoly 
explanation, small monopoly gains from merger in those cases where 
firms chose to remain cartelized. The two explanations are also consistent 
with vertical mergers occurring in response to laws against cartels. Verti-
cal mergers could occur under the monopoly explanation if the average 
(monopoly) price charged the buyer after the horizontal merger of a large 
part of the industry is higher than the average price charged previously by 
1 0 I p re sen t a more detailed account of these points in Bittlingmayer, Price Fixing and the 
A d d y s t o n Pipe Case , supra note 7, at 107-14. Another important difference between merger 
a n d p r ice fixing is that price-fixing cartels can more easily add and drop members as demand 
c o n d i t i o n s change . These conditions determine the appropriate scope of the cartel. Conse-
q u e n t l y , the extension of a merger beyond the firms involved in the preceding price-fixing 
ca r t e l is consis tent with the merger having the same aim as the cartel. This may occur if the 
ca r t e l wou ld have expanded at about the time of the merger in the absence of merger . 
C o n c e r n i n g the mergers of 1898-1902, it should also be pointed out that some firms may 
h a v e b e e n included in a consolidation if there was a substantial chance that antimerger 
legis la t ion o r Supreme Cour t decisions would have hampered merger in the future. 
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the cartelized industry. (This is a minimum condition since vertical inte-
gration also entails costs.) Vertical mergers could occur under the market 
failure explanation if the vertical mergers provided the next best solution 
to market failure. 
The two theories do diverge at several points. The monopoly theory 
makes no prediction about the influence of fixed costs on the probability 
of collusion 1 1 (independent of its effects on the number of competitors), 
while the market failure explanation predicts that collusion is more likely 
the larger are each plant 's fixed costs in relation to factors such as search 
costs and geographic dispersion. The monopoly theory also makes no 
prediction about the probability of collusion over the business cycle, 
while the market failure theory predicts that collusion is more likely in an 
industry downturn when the divergence between average and marginal 
cost is greatest . 1 2 Finally, the monopoly explanation predicts that collu-
sion is less likely the easier it is to enter the industry, while the market 
13 
failure explanation predicts collusion even in industries with easy entry. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST POLICY 
This section reviews developments in antitrust policy. 1 4 Four points 
deserve emphasis: £ . C . Knight made merger legal, at least in the minds 
1 1 The ratio of fixed to variable costs is sometimes thought to be related to the l ike l ihood 
of collusion, especially if the industry is operating short of capacity. It is argued tha t as t h e 
firm approaches bankruptcy , the benefits of price fixing (minimizing losses) inc rease , whi le 
the cost of price fixing stays the same. Grant ing this argument, consider the case w h e r e t h e 
price of the variable input increases and the industry faces inelastic demand. A l though t h e 
ratio of fixed to variable costs has decreased, the divergence between fixed and va r i ab l e 
costs has not , and the incentives to cartelization remain the same. It has also b e e n a r g u e d 
that a greater divergence of fixed and variable costs makes collusion less likely b e c a u s e t h e 
incentives to cheat are greater . 
1 2 See Peter Asch & J. J. Seneca , Is Collusion Profitable? 58 Rev. Econ . and S t a t i s . 1 
(1976), for evidence that price-fixing firms are less successful than firms as a whole . I t shou ld 
be emphasized that while the divergence between average and marginal cost (as wel l a s 
between average variable and marginal cost) is usually greater during a d o w n t u r n , t h e 
probability of successful collusion also depends on the likelihood that firms can e n f o r c e 
the collusion, and this depends partly on the length of the expected horizon over w h i c h t h e 
potential colluders can be expected to work together. If some firms are likely t o l eave t h e 
industry during the next downturn , agreement is less likely. One implication is that co l lu s ion 
is more probable , o ther things equal , during the start of an upswing. See Lester G . T e i s e r , A 
Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements , 53 J. Business 27 (1980), for an analysis of the i ncen -
tives to collude under different expected horizons. 
1 3 Perfectly frictionless entry and exit is compatible with the absence of a " s u s t a i n a b l e " 
equil ibr ium. See Baumol , Panzar , & Willig, supra note 7, especially ch. 2; and S h a r k e y , T h e 
Theory of Natural Monopoly, supra note 7, ch. 5. 
1 4 Fo r general background on this topic see Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal A n t i t r u s t 
Policy (1955); and William Let win, Law and Economic Policy in America (1965). L e s t e r G . 
Teiser , Genesis of the Sherman Act (December 1982) (Working Paper N o . 24, C e n t e r S t u d . 
E c o n . and State , Univ . Chicago), presents an economic analysis of the origins of a n t i t r u s t 
policy and railroad regulation. 
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of many lawyers; judicial policy after Knight was directed at cartels and 
not merger; public agitation against the cartels may have added extra 
impetus to the merger wave through the many new state laws and federal 
legislative initiatives directed at the trusts in the years 1896-1900; and the 
na ture of the assault on the trusts in the courts and legislatures was clear 
to the press and the legal profession. 
The pervasive cartelization of the late 1800s resulted in state antitrust 
legislation as early as the late 1880s, but concern over the trust issue 
w a x e d and w a n e d . 1 5 The cycles of interest in controlling the trusts are 
evident in Table 1. For example, the Sherman Act of 1890 was preceded 
in 1889 by the passage of ten antitrust statutes and constitutional amend-
m e n t s at the state level. This legislative effort continued for two more 
y e a r s , but interest in the trust issue dropped off, perhaps because of the 
tariff and free silver issues, perhaps because the new legislation had to be 
t e s ted in the courts . 
W h e n the Sherman Act was tested in 1895 in E. C. Knight,16 the court 
uphe ld a consolidation involving the notorious Sugar Trust. This was 
v i ewed as a setback for antitrust policy. A renewed legislative effort 
began in 1895, which was slowed by the election year of 1896 and the 
Spanish-American War of 1898. This is reflected in the data on new stat-
u t e s and amendments in Table 1. The number of mergers with capitaliza-
t ions of $1 million or more is also shown, and it certainly seems that 
m e r g e r s and antitrust legislation may have been linked, with coincidental 
i nc reases occurring in the years 1888-92 and during the second half of the 
1890s. (Data on U.K. mergers are also shown, and these will be discussed 
in t he next section.) 
O n e widespread interpretation of Knight was that merger was legal, 
a l though price fixing might not b e . 1 7 The origin of the view that merger 
1 5 C a r t e l s o r t rus t s apparent ly existed in coal, oil, sugar, whiskey, cotton bagging, meat, 
c o r d a g e , lead, co t t onseed oil, pig iron, bar iron, crucible steel, nails, stoves, oatmeal milling, 
d r u g re ta i l ing , coa l dealing, ice, t i les, brewing, gunpowder , steel rails, wallpaper, railroad-
i n g , c a n d l e s , sal t , ba rbed wire , and window frames and sashes. See Thorelli, supra note 14, 
a t 7 4 - 7 9 , 158-59 , and Le twin , supra note 14, a t 109. This list is not exhaustive. Inter-
e s t i n g l y , it has some t imes been claimed that these cartels were never effective. Why then, 
o n e s h o u l d a sk , w a s cartel ization tried again and again in so many different industries? Were 
t h e r e n o ne t benef i t s? 
1 6 U n i t e d S t a t e s v. E. C. Knight, 156 U . S . 1 (1898). The case involved the acquisition of 
f o u r P h i l a d e l p h i a refineries by the American Sugar Refining Company (the "Sugar Trus t " ) , 
w h i c h o w n e d a b o u t 60 percent of sugar refining capacity nationwide. The history of the 
S u g a r T r u s t is t r e a t ed in Alfred S. Eichner , The Emergence of Oligopoly (1969). I thank 
L e s t e r T e i s e r for calling my at tent ion to this book and to the emphasis it places on Knight as 
a c a u s e of the merge r wave . 
1 7 I wil l no t p r e s u m e to speak to the question of the correct legal interpretation of E. C. 
Knight. See Phil l ip A r e e d a & Donald F . Turner , Antitrust Law (1978), at 230-32, and 
P o s n e r & E a s t e r b r o o k , supra note 3 , at 36-38, 96, for current interpretations of the case: 
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TABLE 1 
ANTIRUST LEGISLATION AND INDUSTRIAL MERGERS, 1885-1900 
Statutes and U .S . U.K. 
Constitutional Industrial Manufacturing 
Amendments Mergers* Mergers 
1885 0 6 
1886 0 10 
1887 1 8 15 
1888 0 3 19 
1889 10 12 27 
1890 8 13 31 
1891 6 17 17 
1892 2 12 7 
1893 3 7 11 
1894 1 4 12 
1895 6 6 26 
1896 2 5 44 
1897 14 7 52 
1898 2 20 73 
1899 11 87 62 
1900 42 63 
SOURCE.—Statutes and constitutional amendments are from 2 U.S. Industrial Commission, Trusts and 
Industrial Combinations, Statutes and Decisions of Federal, State and Territorial Law (1900). Industrial 
Mergers are from Jesse W. Markham, Survey of the Evidence and Findings on Mergers, in Business 
Concentration and Price Policy 141, 149 (1955). U.K. manufacturing mergers are from Leslie Hannah, 
Mergers in British Manufacturing Industry, 1880-1918, 26 Oxford Econ. Papers 1, 18 (1974). 
*Number of U.S. industrial mergers with capitalizations of $1 million or more. 
was legal appears to have stemmed from the Court's narrow view of what 
constitutes interstate commerce. The Court had argued that 4 'Congress 
did not attempt . . . to limit and restrict the right of corporations created 
by the states or the citizens of the States in the acquisition, control, or 
disposition of property." 1 8 The interpretation that this language made mer-
ger legal was widely adopted in the law journals and other publ icat ions, 1 9 
Knight was followed in Hopkins v. United States, 171 U .S . 578 (1898) and A n d e r s o n v . 
United States, 171 U .S . 604 (1898), but it was avoided in later years . Id. at 38. Swift & C o . v . 
United States, 196 U .S . 375 (1905), a merger case, is cited as the most impor tant link in t h e 
chain by which manufacturing activity came to be included under the Sherman Act . 
1 8 United States v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S . 1, 16-17 (1895). 
1 9 J. D. Forrest , Anti-Monopoly Legislation in the United States, 1 Am. J. S o c . 411, 424 
(1896), claimed that the Sugar Trust decision "reserves to the United States the right t o 
regulate trade and commerce only, and leaves the regulation of the acquisition and cont ro l of 
the property [that is, merger] to the s ta tes . " Similar views appeared in the law j o u r n a l s . 
"While combinations in . . . agricultural and manufacturing industries might have a g r e a t 
indirect effect on commerce, that was not sufficient for Congressional in te r ference . 1 ' E d -
ward B. Whitney, Constitutional Questions under the Federal Anti-Trust L a w , 7 Yale L . J . 
285, 285 (1898). See also Lionel Norman, Legal Restraints on Modern Industr ial C o m b i n a -
tions and Monopolies in the United States, 23 Am. L. Rev. 449, 511 (1899); E. W. Huffcu t t , 
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by several attorneys general , 2 0 and by the four dissenting justices 
in Northern Securities?1 Another part of Knight, which upheld the power 
of Congress to regulate 4 'contracts to buy, sell or exchange goods to be 
transported among the several States ," did appear to leave the door open 
to applying the Sherman Act against cartels . 2 2 
A firestorm of indignation, including a dozen new state laws, followed 
Knight. The state legislation may also have resulted from the impression 
the Court gave that it was up to the states to do something about monop-
o l y . 2 3 The first cartel case to reach the Supreme Court, Trans-Missouri, 
Cons t i tu t iona l Aspec t s of the Federal Control of Corporat ions, 24 Am. L . Rev. 186, 195 
(1900); and Daniel Ryan , The Combinat ions of Corporat ions, 10 Am. Lawyer 448, 449 
(1902). U p until the e v e of Northern Securities, it was possible to argue that " t he agreement 
here [in Addys ton] re la ted to the method of disposing of the articles of manufacture, and not 
to the form of organizat ion of the producer , and therefore, unlike the merger at issue in the 
Sugar C a s e , a m o u n t e d to a regulation of interstate and foreign trade and c o m m e r c e . " 
Wil l iam F . Dana , T h e Supreme Cour t and the Sherman Act , 16 Harv . L . Rev. 178, 181 
(1903). Robe r t L . R a y m o n d , The Federal Antitrust Act, 23 Harv . L. Rev. 353, 376-77 
(1910), s t resses the role of Knight in laying the foundation for the merger wave . 
2 0 S e e J u d s o n H a r m o n , Le t t e r from the Attorney General transmitting a reply to the 
H o u s e Resolu t ion of January 7, 1896, Enforcement of the Laws against Trus ts , Combina-
t ions , e t c . H. R. D o c . N o . 234, 64th Cong. , 1st Sess . (February 8, 1896). ' T h e Sherman 
an t i t rus t law, as cons t rued by the Supreme Court , , . does not apply to the most complete 
m o n o p o l i e s acqui red by unlawful combination of concerns which are naturally competi-
t ive . " Id. at 1-2. A let ter from John W. Griggs, Attorney General in McKinley 's administra-
t ion, s ays that the mergers of 1898 and 1899 were like the sugar combination and therefore 
e x e m p t from the ant i t rus t laws . This letter was published in the New York Herald, according 
to L e t w i n , supra no te 14, at 140. The effectiveness of the Sherman Act was in doubt even 
before Knight. See the discussion of Attorney General Olney's views in id. at 121-22; and 
Thore l l i , supra note 14, a t 383 -93 . 
2 1 Northern Securities was filed as part of President Roosevelt ' s campaign to "cont ro l 
t h e t r u s t s , " and it was decided by a majority of five to four in a highly charged political 
a t m o s p h e r e . Jus t ice Ho lmes felt compelled to observe in his famous dissent that "grea t 
c a s e s a r e called grea t , not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, 
b u t b e c a u s e of s o m e accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the 
feel ings and dis tor ts the j u d g m e n t . " Northern Securities v. United States, 193 U . S . 197, 400 
(1904). H o l m e s , id. a t 404, emphasized that contracts in restraint of trade under common law 
" w e r e con t rac t s with s trangers to the contractor ' s business, and the trade restrained was the 
c o n t r a c t o r ' s o w n . " Such contracts were illegal only if they "amounted to a m o n o p o l y . " 
C o m b i n a t i o n s or conspi rac ies in restraint of trade " w e r e combinations to keep strangers to 
t h e a g r e e m e n t out of the b u s i n e s s . " This, he claimed, was the ground for the decision in 
U n i t e d S ta t e s v. Joint-Traffic A s s ' n , 171 U .S . 505 (1898). " T o suppress competit ion in that 
w a y is o n e thing; to suppress it by fusion is ano the r . " 193 U . S . 197, 410. Relying on Knight, 
J u s t i c e Whi te offered similar conclusions in his separate dissent to Northern Securities: 
" W h i l s t t he p o w e r of Congress extended to commerce . . . it did not embrace the ownership 
of s t o c k in s tate corpora t ions , because the products might subsequently become the subject 
o f i n t e r s t a t e c o m m e r c e . The parallel between the two cases [Knight and Northern Securi-
ties] is comple t e . . . . the ownership of the stock in the corporation was not itself com-
m e r c e . " 193 U . S . 197, 381. 
2 2 U n i t e d S ta tes v . E . C. Knight, 156 U .S . 1, 13 (1895). 
2 3 Id. a t 11. 
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was decided in March of 1897, within two or three months of the flurry of 
new state legislation, and popular unrest may explain why five justices 
thought the Sherman Act should be applied to railroads despite the fact 
that railroad regulation and, in particular, railroad pooling, had been ad-
dressed separately in the Act to Regulate Commerce. The majority said 
clearly that similar agreements between industrial firms would also be 
held illegal. 2 4 
The decision had the effect of 4 'completely unsettling the values of 
railroad securities on the Stock Exchange," according to the Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle.25 The Chronicle also credited the Court's deci-
sion with hampering recovery from the 1896 recession. 2 6 Similar conse-
quences might have been expected in the October 1898 Joint-Traffic deci-
sion, which involved a railroad agreement specifically designed to pass 
antitrust muster, but which the railroads also lost. This case had a smaller 
effect on stock prices though, maybe because the decision was expected, 
maybe because, as the Chronicle suggested, legislation to permit pooling 
was expected. 2 7 
In the meantime the judicial onslaught was extended directly to indus-
trial cartels in the appeals court decision in Addyston, handed down in 
February 1898. The price-fixing cartel of six manufacturers of cast iron 
pipe was found to be in violation of the Sherman Act. The opinion in this 
case is now often considered a classic in the development of the per se 
rule against price fixing, and was written by William Howard Taft, then a 
judge for the sixth circuit. However, Taft was still obliged to address the 
implications of Knight, and he seemingly left open the door to merger . 2 8 
Although the Chronicle was eager to put the best possible interpretation 
on what Taft said concerning the illegality of price-fixing agreements, 
noting that the "Cast Iron Pipe Trust seems to have been obnoxious in 
many ways," it was forced to concede that "there is a part of the dictum 
of the Court which seems to be of wider application, and which has been 
given special prominence in the newspapers." 2 9 
The trade publication for the iron, steel, and hardware industry, Iron 
2 4 United States v. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. 290, 324-25 (1897). 
2 5 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, March 27, 1897, at 586. 
2 6 Id. April 24, 1897, at 774. Whether or not this was true, the Chronicle 's comments show 
that the decision was apparently not obscure or lightly regarded. 
2 7 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, October 29, 1898, at 871. 
2 8 United States v. Addyston Pipe, 85 Fed. 271,296-98 (1898). " T h e subject mat te r of the 
restraint here was not articles of merchandise or their manufacture [as in Knight], but 
contracts for sale of such articles to be delivered across state l i n e s / ' Id. at 298. See a l so the 
Supreme Court 's discussion of this point, Addyston Pipe v. U.S . , 175 U . S . 211, 240 (1899). 
2 9 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, February 19, 1898, at 362. 
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Age, ran a full-column editorial on the decision and concluded that mer-
ger might now replace price fixing. "The new decision is one which may 
gravely affect some of the arrangements now in force among manufactur-
ers in different lines, in which some control over prices is sought by 
concerns otherwise acting independently in the conduct of their business. 
At first sight it looks as though this decision must drive them to actual 
consolidation, which is really more apt to be prejudicial to public interests 
than the losses and temporary agreements which it condemns." 3 0 A 
month later Iron Age reported that "quite a number of meetings of manu-
facturers have been held during the past week all looking to some scheme 
to take off the keen edge of unbridled competition." 3 1 
Developments at lower levels of jurisdiction, aside from Addyston, may 
also have had an influence. For example, Standard Oil, this country's 
best-known trust, came under renewed attack in November of 1897 in 
Ohio 3 2 and in a private antitrust suit filed the following month by the 
United States Pipe Line Company of Pennsylvania. 3 3 The general trend 
was summarized by a speaker in 1899 at the Chicago antitrust confer-
ence , 3 4 and the increased public concern with the trust question is clearly 
reflected in the great volume of literature that appeared even before any-
one was aware that there was a merger wave. 3 5 
All that said, the fact remains that only seven federal cases involving 
3 0 Iron Age, February 17, 1898, at 18. Whitney, supra note 19, at 290, pointed out that 
"Jus t ice Harlan of the Supreme Court (one of the majority of the Court in the Trans-
Missouri case) c o n c u r r e d , , in Taft 's opinion. 
3 1 Iron Age, March 17, 1898, at 30. The widespread breakdown of cartel agreements in 
1896 and 1897, that is, even before Trans-Missouri, has been noted, most recently in a 
forthcoming book by Naomi Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Busi-
ness , 1895-1904. This book attributes the failure of price-fixing cartels and the ensuing 
mergers to the recession of 1896-97. Another possibility is that a substantial increase in the 
likelihood of adverse anti trust policy made it more difficult for firms to collude because the 
threat of withdrawing cooperation in the future was less credible. This line of reasoning 
extends to other events , such as William Jennings Bryan's candidacy, that introduced eco-
nomic uncertainty. 
3 2 Lewis Haney, Business Organization and Combination 215 (1913). 
3 3 Iron Age, December 30, 1897, at 23. 
3 4 Chicago Conference on Trusts 528-29 (Franklin H . Head ed. 1900). 
3 5 See Thorelli, supra note 14, at 329-43, for an overview of popular opinion on the trust 
issue. Charles J. Bullock, "T rus t Literature: A Survey and Cri t ic ism," 15 Q. J. Econ. 167 
(1901), provides a guide to the immense volume of the 1890s professional literature on trusts. 
Several legal books appearing on the trust issue were stimulated by the court cases, not the 
merger wave, which had barely begun. See Andrew J. Hirschl, Combination, Consolidation 
and Succession of Corporat ions (1896); Albert Stickney, State Control of Trade and Com-
merce by National or State Authority (1897); and Frederick H. Cooke, Law of Trade and 
Labor Combinations (1898). 
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horizontal agreements were instituted in the years 1895-99. 3 6 Could these 
cases have caused the merger of a large fraction of U.S. manfacturing? 
Given the hundreds of cartels that apparently operated in the 1890s, the 
probability of conviction (post hoc) was very small. Still, one could argue 
that the cost of an antitrust case is greater than the probability of getting 
caught times the fine. Legal costs, the opportunity costs of managers, and 
the implicit costs of bad publicity (more harassment in the press and from 
government) also have to be reckoned with. But this does not add much, 
given the small number of cases. 
It is also true that expected costs are not the same thing as realized 
costs. "Everything that is, was expected," is not a valid implication of 
rational expectations. The trusts were a lively political issue, and if it is 
surprising today that antitrust enforcement got off to such a slow start in 
the 1890s, it is possible that the slow start may have been surprising at the 
t ime. 3 7 
Another important feature of the uncertain political climate is that it 
decreases the horizon over which a cartel can be expected to opera te . 
Since a cartel is a self-enforcing contract, and since a breach of a self-
enforcing contract is more likely the shorter the expected horizon (be-
cause the losses from noncooperation are less), the antitrust agitation 
would imply a greater tendency for cartels to break down even in the 
absence of large scale convictions. 
Probably the best evidence that business chafed under the prohibit ion 
against cartels is that it made continual efforts to have the Sherman Act 
amended. The trade press and corporation lawyers fulminated against the 
Sherman Act, and several attempts were made in the years 1900-1910 to 
change the law. For example, considerable effort was made on behalf of a 
bill " to legalize contracts and agreements not in unreasonable restraint of 
trade or commerce ." 3 8 
3 6 Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. Law & E c o n . 
365 (1970), at 366, Table 1. 
3 7 The Antitrust Division was established in 1903 and given a half-million dollar a p p r o p r i -
ation. See Thorelli, supra note 14, at 537. 
3 8 Bill S. 6331 to Legalize Contrac ts and Agreements Not in Unreasonable R e s t r a i n t o f 
Trade of Commerce: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the J u d i c i a r y . 
60th Cong. , 1st Sess. (April 1908). Andrew Carnegie, retired and clipping coupons f r o m U . S . 
Steel bonds (he had not wanted stock when he sold his company to the U .S . Steel c o n s o l i d a -
t ion), testified on behalf of legislation to allow "reasonable 1 ' price fixing. The c h a n g e d s t a t u s 
of price fixing, despite the paucity of prosecutions, is reflected in Carnegie 's r e m a r k t h a t 
t k m e n of the highest standing in the past thought they did no wrong and sought no c o n c e a l -
ment . M Congressional s ta tement quoted in Industrial Combinations and Trusts 5 5 7 , 5 5 9 
(W. S. Stevens ed. 1914). For a history of early attempts to change the Sherman A c t , s e e 
Letwin, supra note 14, chs. 6 - 7 . 
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IV. MERGERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM, 1890-1905 
Table 2 shows the remarkable increase in mergers that occurred in the 
late 1890s. The number of firms absorbed by merger in manufacturing and 
mining rose from sixty-nine to 303 between 1897 and 1898, and rose 
further to 1,208 in 1899. Merger disappearances in primary metals and 
metal products rose even more sharply over the same period. Another 
important point is that consolidation of several firms, rather than 
piecemeal acquisition, accounted for roughly 90 percent of all firm disap-
pearances until 1902. 
Firm disappearances count large and small firms alike. A better way to 
get an idea of the scope of the merger wave is to look at total merger 
capitalizations, although this involves substantial double counting when 
firms are formed in a series of mergers. Based on capitalization values, 
more than half of the merger movement in mining and manufacturing 
during the peak years 1899-1901 can be accounted for by mergers in metal 
industries. The merger movement as a whole seems to have encompassed 
between one-fourth and one-half of U.S. industry. 3 9 
One issue that arises in connection with the U.S. mergers at the turn of 
the century is that Great Britain had a merger wave at about the same 
time. In fact, it is possible to show that the two are related statistically. 
This suggests the possibility of a joint cause, apparently confined to the 
United States and United Kingdom. It is not clear though if the two 
merger movements are in fact part of the same phenomenon since there 
are some noteworthy differences and since statistical correlations are 
never enough to establish causation. A plausible joint cause has so far 
proved elusive. 
Table 3 presents comparable data for U.S. and British mergers for the 
years 1895-1905. Comprehensive U.S. data go back only to 1895. Compa-
rable U.S. and U.K. data for earlier years covering the number of manu-
facturing mergers, with the U.S. data based on a less authoritative source, 
are shown in Table 1. Although it is clear that there was an increase in 
3 9 The 1898-1902 capitalizations amounted to 53 percent of the value of all manufacturing 
and mining operat ions . However , this probably overs ta tes the extent of the merger move-
ment because the same property was often involved in several successive mergers. See Yale 
Brozen, Mergers in Perspect ive 6-8 (1982). According to one estimate based on incomplete 
merger data , about 15 percent of the total number of plants and employees in manufacturing 
in 1900 were involved in mergers over the years 1887-1904. See Jesse W. Markham, Survey 
of the Evidence and Findings on Mergers , in Business Concentrat ion and Price Policy: A 
Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research 141, 152 (1955). According to another 
est imate, 318 industrial combinat ions formed in the years 1897-1904 controlled 40 percent of 
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mergers in both countries in the late 1890s, there are several notable 
differences. First, the United States seems to have had a larger wave, and 
a sharper increase. (Although the U.S. data go back only to 1895, I will 
extend my range for the U.K. data to 1890 in the comparisons of U.S. and 
U.K. data that follow to allow for the possibility that the U.K. "wave" 
started earlier.) The peak U.K. value for mergers (seventy-three) is ten 
times the lowest value (seven in 1892), while the U.S. peak (191) is twenty 
times the lowest value (nine). Similarly, the highest value for U.K. firm 
disappearances, which occurs in 1899, is twenty-three times the lowest 
value of eleven, which occurred in 1893; in the U.S. the highest and 
lowest values are 979 and twenty-six, implying a thirty-eight-fold in-
crease. Since the U.S. series is truncated at 1895, these comparisons 
probably understate the differences. Only in capitalizations are the British 
increases greater than those for the United States: an increase of 109-fold 
from 1893 to 1900, compared to a U.S. increase by a factor of sixty-six 
from 1896 to 1899. Note though that the average yearly increase is about 
the same. Second, U.S. mergers involved more firms per merger, al-
though this difference narrowed after Northern Securities was filed. 
Third, the U.S. mergers, although roughly equal in number to U.K. merg-
ers, apparently involved much larger firms and quite likely more succes-
sive mergers in the same industry. Cumulative capitalizations in the U.S. 
were seventeen times U.K. capitalizations. In one year, 1901, capitaliza-
tions were fifty-eight times as great. One reason for this may be that U.S. 
mergers were concentrated in metal and metal fabricating, where average 
plant size tends to be greater. Twenty-six percent of the 2,782 U.S. firm 
disappearances from 1895 to 1909 occurred in this industry, while only 
11 percent of the 1,428 U.K. disappearances took place there. Nearly 30 
percent of the U.K. disappearances took place in textiles, and another 28 
percent took place in food and drink manufacture (chiefly brewing), to-
gether accounting for nearly 60 percent of British firm disappearances. In 
contrast, 22 percent of U.S. mergers took place in textiles, and less than 4 
percent took place in food (and drink) products. Although comparable 
U.K. data are unavailable, it should be noted that textile capitalizations 
account for less than 1 percent of total U.S. manufacturing capitalizations 
for 1895-1904, while primary metals alone account for 41 percent . 4 0 
Although these comparisons suggest that the U.S. merger wave was 
larger and more pronounced, and that it tended to be relatively stronger in 
4 0 Data are from Leslie Hannah, Mergers in British Manufacturing Industry, 1880-1918, 
26 Oxford Econ. Papers 1, 18 (1974); and Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American 
Industry, 1895-1956 (1959), at 144-53. These comparisons are meant only to suggest the 
differences involved. A more formal investigation would require information on the assets 
and numbers of firms in various British and U.S. industries. 
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certain industries, there is still the question why mergers occurred in both 
countries. It can be shown that merger time series data for the years 1895-
1918 for the United States and United Kingdom are related. 4 1 For ex-
ample, there is å correlation between year-to-year changes of U.K. firm 
disappearances and year-to-year changes of U.S. firm disappearances by 
consolidation (r = .38, which is significant at the 10 percent level for 
twenty-three observations). But what should be done with this empirical 
finding? Granting the fact of a statistical relationship, I would not want to 
insist on a single explanation. Well-worn but valid arguments force me to 
observe that such results could be spurious, 4 2 and we have precious little 
in the way of a plausible common explanation. Under these circum-
stances, investigating the two movements one at a time strikes me as a 
defensible research strategy. 
In examining the data we should also look to see whether merger activ-
ity is inconsistent with the timing of key antitrust decisions. Table 4 
presents quarterly merger figures and some key events in antitrust history 
for the years 1895-1900. Bold-face numbers show where the quarterly 
merger figures reached a new high (beginning with the third quarter of 
1895). Thus E. C. Knight was followed by three successive quarters of 
increased merger activity, consistent with the view that it did signal that 
merger was legal under the Sherman Act. Only twelve firm disappear-
ances occurred between this mini-wave and the first quarter of 1897, when 
Trans-Missouri was announced and many state antitrust laws were 
passed. After a one-quarter lull, merger activity increased to unprece-
dented levels, then decreased just before the Addyston appeals decision, 
only to increase when the decision was announced. After another one-
quarter lull, merger activity increased steadily until early 1899 and re-
mained above pre-1897 levels until the end of 1900. 
It would be unrealistic to expect data of this kind to show unambigu-
ously that Supreme Court cases caused mergers, since the lags could be 
variable and the cases are only a proxy for actual expected policy. Inter-
pretations of court doctrine by prominent authorities, initiatives to amend 
4 1 These are the years for which the data cited supra note 40 overlap. 
4 2 For example, anti trust enforcement may be procyclical. This seems reasonable since 
landmarks in more stringent antitrust policy such as the passage of the Sherman Act (1890), 
the per se rule (1897-99), Northern Securities, the tobacco and oil dissolutions (1911), and 
the reestablishment of the per se rule in United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 
(1927), occurred during periods of expansion. Backsliding, as in E. C. Knight, United States 
v. United States Steel , 251 U .S . 417 (1920), Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U .S . 
344 (1933), and the N R A cartelizations, occurred in periods of contraction. The less volatile 
U.K. series may have been the response to other developments that were also related to 
business activity. The business cycles of the United States and the United Kingdom were of 
course related, in part because both were on the gold standard. 
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TABLE 4 
QUARTERLY MERGER STATISTICS AND ANTITRUST POLICY, 1895-1900 
Manufacturing 
Year and Merger Capitalizations Quarterly Firm 
Events Quarter ($ Millions) Disappearances 
1895:1 1.0 3 E. C. Knight 
II 10.4 14 
III 14.5 24 
IV .6 1 
1896:1 6.1 3 
II 4.5 7 
III 0 0 Elect ion campaign of 1896 
IV 1.3 1 
1897:1 10.0 8 State L a w s and Trans-
II 0 0 Missouri 
III 81.6 38 
IV 10.3 17 
1898:1 167.6 132 Addyston (Appeals Court) 
II 44.7 64 Spanish-American War 
HI 209.3 19 
IV 212.3 76 Joint Traffic 
1899:1 862.4 410 
II 522.4 271 
III 373.4 316 
IV 112.9 128 Addyston (Supreme Court) 
1900:1 149.9 147 
11 126.9 55 
III 98.3 60 
IV 11.8 53 
SOURCE.—Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry, 1895-1956 (1959), at 139 Tables 
B-l, 164 C-7; and 1 U.S. Courts, Federal Antitrust Decisions (1912). 
NOTE.—These figures do not agree with Nelson's annual statistics because he could not assign all 
mergers to a specific quarter. Beginning with 1895: III, boldface numerals indicate a new high. 
legislation, and declarations of war are all factors that could make merg-
ers occur one or two quarters sooner or later. However, I would empha-
size that increases in mergers occurred within one or two quarters or at 
the same time as the crucial cases, and not before or after very long 
delays. Statistical tests in Section VII, which use a longer time series for 
mergers, confirm the empirical connection between changes in antitrust 
policy and merger in a more formal way. 
V. SOME CASE STUDIES OF MERGER 
Two well-studied industries, railroading and iron and steel, provide 
concrete instances in which merger followed extensive cartelization after 
the court decisions of 1897 and 1898. In several industries antitrust 
charges preceded merger, and in at least two cases we know of, the firms 
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merged after looser arrangements were ruled out on the basis of legal 
advice. 
A. Iron and Steel 
Cartel agreements in iron and steel existed in pig iron, steel billets, steel 
rails, structural steel, steel plate, nails and wire, and numerous other 
products. 4 3 U.S. Steel was formed in 1901 as a holding company orga-
nized under the laws of New Jersey. Its three major components were the 
three largest iron and steel producers in the United States: the Carnegie 
Company, the Federal Steel Company, and the National Steel Company. 
U.S. Steel also assumed control of a number of producers of finished 
goods that dominated their fields, including the American Tin Plate Com-
pany, the American Steel and Wire Company, and the National Tube 
Company, and it absorbed substantial transportation and mining facilities 
that had previously been independent firms. In turn, two of the major 
steel companies that became part of U.S. Steel, Federal and National 
Steel, were themselves formed through mergers in 1898, as were many of 
the producers of finished products. For example, the American Steel and 
Wire Company was organized in April of 1898 out of fourteen mills, and 
the successor consolidation, with twenty-nine plants in 1900, owned 
nearly every wire, wire rod, and wire nail plant in the United States. The 
Wire Nail Association had cartelized this industry in the mid-1890s.4 4 
The connection between price fixing and merger in the steel industry 
can probably be explored at greater length, but the major developments in 
this industry certainly make it reasonable to infer that merger performed 
some of the function of the abandoned cartels. The mergers also occurred 
at just the right time to raise the suspicion that they were a response to 
legal developments. In addition, iron and steel provides a classic industry 
where production takes place under fixed costs and where transportation 
costs were probably high enough to create regional markets with small 
numbers of competitors. 4 5 
4 3 This sketch of developments in iron and steel is based on Eliot Jones, The Trust 
Problem in the United States 186 (1921). Charles Schwab, who had been Andrew Carnegie's 
protegé, and who was later president of U.S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel, was asked while 
testifying before the Industrial Commission whether pooling arangements had existed before 
the formation of U . S . Steel in 1901. " Y e s , " he replied, k f cin all lines of business, not only in 
steel, but in everything else. There were similar agreements, known as joint arrangements to 
maintain prices. They have existed in all lines of business as long as I can remember." 
Quoted in Haney, supra note 32, at 146. 
4 4 Nails and Wire in 1898, Iron Age, January 5, 1899, at 41. 
4 5 This is illustrated in Bittlingmayer, Price Fixing and the Addyston Pipe Case, supra 
note 7, at 70-72 . Cast iron pipe was transported at the same rate as pig iron. The f.o.b. price 
of pig iron varied between $6.00 and $12.00 per ton in the 1890s, and the cost of transporta-
tion in 1893 from the southern producing district in Alabama to Cincinnati (400 miles) was 
$2.75 per ton, or as much as 31 percent of the delivered price. 
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B. Railroading 
Railroading provides another instance in which production is carried 
out with substantial fixed expenses, and in which the relevant market 
(transportation between two points) frequently has few competitors. In 
addition, railroad cartels were the focus of the first two significant cartel 
cases to reach the Supreme Court. 4 6 
Railroads had passed through trying times in the early and mid-1890s. 
Although the 1887 Act to Regulate Commerce had prohibited pooling 
(apparently to satisfy one senator and on an experimental basis) , 4 7 pooling 
agreements continued to be prevalent. These agreements faltered in the 
mid-1890s however, possibly because of their shadowy legal status. Two 
major recessions also occurred in that decade, and some combination of 
low freight rates and low freight volume caused many railroads to go into 
receivership. Although some railroad consolidations had been undertaken 
in the mid-1890s, their number increased sharply after the Trans-Missouri 
and Joint Traffic decisions. This is evident in the data on mergers for 
twelve-month periods ending in June that are displayed in Table 5. Merg-
ers increased substantially in 1897, following Trans-Missouri, and de-
clined while Joint Traffic wound its way to the Supreme Court. This case 
was decided in October of 1898, and mergers and consolidations in-
creased for the period July 1898-1899. Over the next twelve months, 
ending June 1900, mergers increased to a new high. 
The effect of these mergers is also reflected in the growth of class 1 
railroads—those with 1,000 miles or more of track, also shown in Table 5. 
The number of class 1 railroads increased from forty-four to fifty-one (or 
16 percent) between June 1899 and June 1902. In addition, the larger 23 
percent increase in class 1 mileage suggests that a good deal of the overall 
growth came from existing class 1 roads. The percentage of railroad 
mileage under class 1 control increased from 57 percent in 1899 to 65 
percent in 1902. 
Merger was only one way of achieving coordinated operation of differ-
ent railroads. Another method, pioneered by Standard Oil and adopted by 
the railroads in 1899, was the "community of interest," which formed the 
basis for the "great systems'' associated with Morgan, Gould, Harr iman, 
and others. 4 8 
4 6 I thank Lester Teiser for asking, after reading the first draft of this paper, wha t h a p -
pened in railroading. 
4 7 19 U.S . Industrial Commission, Final Report, House Doc. No. 380, 57th C o n g . , 2d 
Sess. (1902), at 337-38. (This volume bears the title Transportation and was wr i t t en by 
William Z. Ripley.) 
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These developments are consistent with the view that the Supreme 
Court drove railroads to other forms of joint control, although not always 
merger. Writing in 1902 for the Industrial Commission, William Ripley 
claimed that a less formal organization took the place of the Joint Traffic 
Association. "It continues to perform many functions of a cooperative 
character, and has not occasioned serious complaints on the part of ship-
pers. There seems to be some sort of agreement between the lines by 
which harmony is engendered." 4 9 Harmony among members of the 
Trans-Missouri Freight Association was apparently sought by a commu-
nity of interest. 5 0 
There seem to be two factors that offset the influence of the 1897 and 
1898 decisions. The prohibition of pooling and the erosion of Interstate 
Commerce Commission powers in the early 1890s 5 1 probably stimulated 
some consolidations among railroads even before these court decisions 
were made. Consistent with this, Table 5 shows that an annual average of 
about 2 percent of U.S. mileage was merged or consolidated over the 
years 1890-96. However, serious legislative efforts were made to permit 
pooling and to reform the regulation of railroads in other ways in the late 
1890s and ensuing years . 5 2 The overall effect of these two influences was 
probably to soften the impact of the two railroad cases. 
C. Shoe Machinery and Explosives 
In at least two instances we have evidence that legal advice regarding 
the illegality of looser forms of organization played a role in inducing firms 
to merge. United Shoe53 concerned a consolidation conceived in 1898 and 
undertaken in order to evade the antitrust laws, according to testimony of 
a key figure. This was noted in a dissent by Justice Clarke, who also 
thought that Trans-Missouri had suggested that there might be legal prob-
lems. 5 4 
another method used to obtain control of a railroad. For more recent accounts of the 
development of the "Great S y s t e m s / ' see Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand 172-74 
(1977), and W., The United States: Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism 27, 38 (1980). Accord-
ing to a table compiled in 1901 by the Common Carrier, a trade journal , more than half of 
U .S . mileage was under the control of six "financial in teres ts ," of which four had at least 
18,000 miles of track each. U .S . Industrial Commission, supra note 47, at 307 -8 . The United 
States had approximately 200,000 miles of railway in 1900. 
4 9 U . S . Industrial Commission, supra note 47, at 335. 
5 0 Id. at 336. 
5 1 Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916 (1965), ch. 4. 
5 2 Id. ch. 5. 
5 3 United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 247 U.S . 32 (1918). 
5 4 E. P . Howe of the Goodyear Company, and a lawyer, is quoted as objecting to a 
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The antitrust laws were also mentioned in connection with the consoli-
dation of Du Pont properties in 1903. Following the acquisition of several 
explosives plants, the executive committee of the Du Pont Company 
addressed the question of firm organization. The decisive factor, which 
was stressed by both lawyers who had been asked for advice, was that the 
existing arrangements, involving both cartel agreements and distinct sub-
sidiaries, were "absolutely illegal." 
Walker [one of the lawyers hired by Du Pont] particularly stressed that the 
Supreme Court, in its interpretations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, had opposed 
practices restricting production. On the other hand, Walker continued, 4 ' the re-
strictions placed on large aggregations of capital are not intended to prevent 
legitimate expansion of business, however large." The Chicago lawyer pointed to 
the E. C. Knight case of 1895 in which the Court found the American Sugar 
Company not guilty, even though it controlled 90% of the sugar production in the 
United States, because it had "no intermediate selling company or corporation 
and no exclusive sales contracts." Then in the Addyston Pipe and Steel case of 
1899 the Court dissolved the contract among six companies that set up exclusive 
marketing areas for each of the six firms. Moreover, Walker was certain that in the 
Northern Securities case then pending before the Supreme Court, the use of a 
holding company to restrain production or control competition would be declared 
illegal. " I would avoid," he concluded, "all 'entangling alliances' or contracts, 
but stand simply on the legality of your incorporation and the management and 
conduct of its corporate business. 5 5 
These legal views illustrate several plausible consequences of the 
Supreme Court 's antitrust decisions. First Knight does seem to have 
been thought of as sanctioning merger. Second, Addyston appears to have 
been thought of as more than a simple price-fixing case. One lawyer 
apparently thought that it outlawed exclusive territories even in the case 
where the firms might be subsidiaries of the same holding company. It 
seems strange today, but a turn-of-the-century lawyer probably saw a 
close connection between price-fixing agreements and other sorts of busi-
ness relations. This is reflected in the legal literature, 5 6 as well as in Taft's 
"ha rmon ious a r r a n g e m e n t " or "work ing agreement" because " I had a sort of indefinite fear 
that it might be deemed to be a combination in restraint of trade. . . . I had an indefinite fear 
that if the two companies remained separate but, for instance, had a joint factory and joint 
branch offices, there might be something in the way of restraint of trade. I insisted, for that 
reason, that there should be a complete merger and consolidat ion." Quoted in United States 
v. United Shoe Machinery , 247 U . S . 32, 77 (1918). 
5 5 Alfred D. Chandler & Stephen Salsbury, Pierre S. Du Pont and the Making of the 
Modern Corporat ion, 112-13 (1971). I thank Alfred Chandler for directing me to this passage 
in response to an inquiry. Haney , supra note 32, at 244-45, summarizes the substitution of 
complete merger for looser forms and claims that the aim was in part to "gain a stronger 
legal pos i t i on . " Similarly, Haney , id. 2d 243, attributes the 1904 consolidation in the tobacco 
industry to concern about vulnerability to antitrust. 
5 6 See the works by Hirschl , Stickney, and Cooke, supra note 35. 
104 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
opinion in Addyston, which takes great pains to distinguish cartel agree-
ments from other arrangements between firms.57 Third, this account 
shows that Northern Securities influenced how lawyers thought about the 
legality of the holding company, even, as here, before the decision was 
handed down. 
D. Cotton Oil, Sugar, Cast Iron Pipe, Oil Refining, and 
Meat Packing 
In another important class of mergers consolidation followed closely on 
the heels of antitrust action directed against specific cartels. At least five 
mergers fit this description: the reorganization in 1889 of the Cotton Oil 
Trust, 5 8 the acquisition in 1892 of major competitors by the American 
Sugar Refining Company, 5 9 the merger in 1898 of the defendants in Addys-
ton Pipe,60 the formation in 1899 of the Standard Oil holding company, 6 1 
and the creation in 1902 of National Packing. 6 2 
E. The View of an Important Promoter 
Charles R. Flint was a leading promoter of turn-of-the-century mergers 
who mentioned the antitrust laws as an important cause of the consolida-
tions. His observations deserve some attention, partly because his analy-
sis of the gains and losses from large firms has the ring of a familiar 
economic argument. The drawback to the merger of several industrial 
firms, Flint might say today, is that it creates a principal-agent problem. 
While the financial interest of the individual entrusted with the local manage-
ment of the sub-company or plant is as large as before, his percentage of interest, 
owing to its being merged with other concerns, is very much less, and the induce-
ment of exertion and economy is not as large as before. In the export and import 
business we are able clearly to divide our business into departments, according to 
countries or staples, interesting each head in the department he manages. Here 
5 7 United States v. Addyston, 85 Fed. 271, 281-83 (6th Cir. 1898). The distinction s e e m s 
to have been hard to draw; Taft's test for distinguishing good from bad restraints is t e r m e d 
"circular" in Posner & Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 110. The possibility that the ca r t e l s 
may have been viewed as part of a larger class of agreements raises the question w h e t h e r 
other sorts of agreements besides classic cartels may have been converted to merged firms 
because of concern about antitrust. Although not converted through merger, Genera l E l e c -
tric and Westinghouse had an agreement on the joint use of patents. See Thorelli, supra n o t e 
14, at 271. 
5 8 Thorelli, supra note 14, at 79. 
5 9 Eichner, supra note 16, at 6. 
6 0 Bittlingmayer, Price Fixing and the Addyston Pipe Case, supra note 7, at 85. 
6 1 Haney, supra note 32, at 215. 
6 2 2 Simon N . Whitney, Antitrust Policies 33 (1958). 
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the departments are independent. But in the case of the consolidation of manufac-
turing operations, such an arrangement is very difficult, as there is likely to be a 
conflict of interest, owing to their interdependence. It is therefore undesirable to 
have any individual interested otherwise than in the common result. 6 3 
Flint mentioned several advantages to merger against which this problem 
had to be weighed. Among the more or less innocuous gains are discounts 
on raw materials, the specialization of plants, the regulation of product 
diversity, economies of distribution, and inventory savings. To this he 
added the prevention of price cutting and the "demoralization'' of busi-
ness that occurs during business downturns. "Under industrial combina-
tion, however, each concern obtains a fair share of the reduced prices; 
and the contraction of business is conducted with the orderliness of a 
retreat of a well-disciplined a rmy . " 6 4 
Flint did not think merger was the ideal solution, however, and, as the 
quotation above shows, he seems to have preferred a looser form that 
preserved some of the independence of individual plants while controlling 
prices. In testimony before the Industrial Commission, Flint was asked 
what sort of trust legislation he favored. He replied that he thought it was 
difficult to draft beneficial legislation and that the existing antitrust laws 
had tended to force mergers. 
My idea is that affairs of trade are best regulated by natural laws. It is very 
difficult to suggest legislation of any radical character that can supplant to advan-
tage the natural law of supply and demand. For instance, the courts in Germany 
have sustained the agreements which we call restraint of trade agreements. The 
result of this has been that there have been fewer combinations in Germany. In 
this country laws have been passed against agreements between corporations for 
the purpose of regulating trade. Well, that very legislation has had a tendency to 
force organization of industrial combinations. The legislators who formulated the 
restraint of trade laws did not anticipate that those very laws would be one of the 
strongest reasons for bringing about the organization of industrial combinations.6 5 
In summary, Flint saw the lack of appropriate incentives as a major cost 
of merger, he thought merger prevented price cutting during recessions 
but (reading between the lines) at a greater cost than price fixing, and he 
attributed a large fraction of the U.S. merger activity to the antitrust law. 
F. An Overview of Changing Industry Organization 
The costs associated with single-firm organization are also consistent 
with the determined search for some federative or decentralized industry 
Char les R. Flint, The Gospel of Industrial Steadiness, in The Trust: Its Book 86 (1902). 
Id. at 89. 
Id. at 225-26. 
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organization, whether authentic trusts or other devices, such as pools, 
price-fixing agreements, holding companies, or "communities of inter-
est," that were often called trusts. The specific circumstances of an in-
dustry dictated what was the best form of organization, subject to the 
constraints of the evolving antitrust law and of the formidable but limited 
creativity of corporation lawyers and company officials desirous of 
finding ways around the law. Broadly speaking, the legal attack on the 
trusts and cartels in the late 1880s led to the first round of mergers and, in 
one case, the first community of interest; the renewed attack on pools and 
price fixing led to merger through complete consolidation; and the holding 
company, whose potential was discovered in 1899, became a popular 
merger device until it proved to be susceptible in 1904 to a rule of reason. 
Complete merger appears to have been a last resort in many cases. It is 
interesting that the most earnestly pursued monopoly, Standard Oil, was 
the first trust, the first community of interest, and the first of the new 
generation of holding companies in its various incarnations. 6 6 
One objection to the idea that mergers create diseconomies of manage-
ment is that the firms in an industry can merge and achieve through 
internal decentralization the economies that come from independent re-
sponsibility and action. So, the argument goes, it cannot be true that the 
firms merged reluctantly and at the expense of a lower-cost form of or-
ganization. This observation has some drawbacks. First, it makes the 
question of industry organization open-ended, posing the same difficulty 
for the study of firm size as is usually implied by the assumption of 
constant returns to scale. If there were no costs to merger, why did firms 
not merge before 1898? Second, it breaks the connection between forms 
of business organization that are legal and any real or presumptive 
benefits. If there were no connection, then it would have been an easy 
matter to set up a sham corporation in the face of legal action against a 
cartel and continue as before. However, in practice, ownership rights of 
individual shareholders in a merged firm are general, and the concern of 
the shareholders will be to maximize the value of the entire enterprise. 
Consequently, this implies the necessity of imposing restrictions on man-
agers who can no longer be allowed to maximize the value of individual 
plants because of the detrimental effect this would have on the firm as a 
whole. A sham merger, one in which the rights and obligations of share-
holders were left unaffected, would very likely have come under attack 
6 6 This thumbnail sketch comes from Haney, supra note 32; and Chandler, The Visible 
Hand, supra note 48, chs. 9 - 1 1 . Chandler in particular stresses the emergence of new 
administrative forms. This was an important long-term development that may have been 
accelerated or influenced by antitrust legislation, as Chandler suggests. Id. at 332-34. 
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for abusing the corporate form, and the legal doctrines involved in "pierc-
ing the corporate veil" would have come into play. So, although merging 
firms can pick from a range of organizational forms, that range was proba-
bly not large enough to allow them to mimic exactly the incentives avail-
able under complete independence. 
VI. ECONOMISTS AND THE 1898-1902 MERGER WAVE 
The idea that antitrust policy played a significant role in the Great 
Merger Wave has received a cool welcome in modern studies of turn-of-
the-century antitrust policy and merger activity. It fared somewhat better 
in the first few decades after the mergers took place, although the topic 
never seemed worthy of extensive study. Lewis Haney, in an insightful 
analysis of the structure and function of various forms of business organi-
zation, mentioned the role of antitrust several times in passing. 6 7 Eliot 
Jones devoted most of the chapter "The Modern Trust Movement" in his 
1921 book The Trust Problem in the United States to a description of the 
various forms the trust could take, and he mentioned briefly that the 
antitrust laws had caused firms to adopt tight consolidations. 6 8 He quoted 
the passage from United Shoe Machinery that suggests that antitrust pol-
icy may have caused merger in that case, but he did not comment on 
whether antitrust policy was a cause of the consolidation in the steel 
industry, focusing instead on "the desire to restrict or eliminate competi-
t ion . " 6 9 J. M. Clark speculated that the antitrust laws, among other fac-
tors, drove the cartels to merger, 7 0 and a Brookings publication that ap-
peared in 1939 emphasizes that Knight made merger legal, but attributes 
the mergers to the expansion of the late 1890s.71 Many of the classic 
works on the trust issue view the rise of the trust, broadly defined, as the 
main issue, and seem to regard the choice among trust forms as a rela-
tively minor question. Consequently, they emphasize the nineteenth cen-
tury's falling price level, the development of railroads, the rise of large 
scale production and similar long-term developments, but they do not 
mention antitrust . 7 2 
6 7 Haney , supra note 32, at 205, 221, 242. 
6 8 Jones , supra note 43, at 390-91. 
6 9 Id. at 197, 199. 
7 0 John Maurice Clark, Social Control of Business 381 (1939). 
7 1 1 Leveret t S. Lyon, Myron W. Watkins, & Victor Abramson, Government and Eco-
nomic Life 262-66 (1939). 
7 2 See, for example , Charles S. Tippets & Shaw Livermore, Business Organization and 
Public Control (1941). ch. 15; Henry R. Seager & Charles A. Gullick, Trust and Corporation 
Problems (1929), ch. 5; and Jeremiah W. Jenks & Walter E. Clark, The Trust Problem 
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By the 1950s the notion was viewed with much skepticism. George 
Stigler gives primary consideration to changes in corporation law initiated 
by New Jersey in the late 1880s and to the growth of the New York Stock 
Exchange "into an effective market for industrial securi t ies ." 7 3 The 
growth of the exchange, Stigler argues, allowed promoters to capitalize 
monopoly gains. He plays down the role of antitrust. "The effectiveness 
of the Sherman Law in dealing with conspiracies was not clear until 1899, 
when the Addyston Pipe case was decided; and there was a contem-
poraneous wave of amalgamations in England, where conspiracies were 
unenforceable but not actionable." 7 4 
I have tried to show that the decisions before 1899 should not be dis-
counted and that the British mergers did not necessarily result from the 
same influences. Looking at corporation law and securities markets as 
"causes" also raises questions. U.S. railroad securities were traded for 
many decades before 1900 in both the United States and the United King-
dom. 7 5 It is difficult to imagine that the liquidity of securities markets 
increased so rapidly because of innovations in communication, say, that 
one industry after another became consolidated in a five-year period. It 
seems just as sensible to say that the formation of large firms increased 
the demand for liquid securities markets. 
The role of the new corporation laws is also less than clear. New Jersey 
allowed holding companies and permitted corporations to exchange stock 
for property in 1889, nine years before the merger wave began. Other 
states soon passed similar legislation. 7 6 It is possible that states competed 
for corporations following the actions taken against trusts in the late 
1890s. Another fact that has to be faced is that a number of industrial and 
railroad mergers took place between 1888 and 1893, proving that it could 
be done. Why did most firms wait until after 1897? In addition, corpora-
tions could consolidate before 1889 with special permission of state legis-
(1917), ch. 3. Nelson, supra note 40, ch. 4, examines four explanations: "retardat ion of 
industrial growth; the immediately preceding expansion of the national railroad sys tem; the 
growth of a highly organized capital market; the increase of motivation toward market 
control ." Id. at 71 . Eichner, supra note 16, at 93-119, also surveys these and related 
hypotheses. 
7 3 Stigler, supra note 5, at 101. 
7 4 Id. at 102 (footnote omitted). 
7 5 Nelson, supra note 40, at 89, notes that causation could run from mergers to the stock 
market as well as in the opposite direction. His data show no marked increase in the n u m b e r 
of listed issues in the 1890s, although the number of shares traded does increase about 
threefold from 1896 to 1899. Id. at 90, chart 4. Nelson also notes the earlier development of 
the British capital market. Id. at 133. 
7 6 Haney, supra note 32, at 220-21. Eichner, supra note 16, at 150, concludes that the 
New Jersey laws were not necessary, but merely convenient. 
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latures; they could purchase property; and some conducted sub rosa hold-
ing company relat ions. 7 7 The community of interest, used by Standard Oil 
in the 1890s and after its dissolution in 1911 was also an alternative. 7 8 
Jesse Markham is also inclined to give a minor role to antitrust policy in 
a 1955 survey of merger movements. 7 9 His study reviews evidence linking 
business activity and merger, and he evaluates various explanations for 
the merger movements at the turn of the century, the 1920s, and the 
1940s. He concludes that the timing and scope of the first wave "defies 
precise analysis" and mentions the Sherman Act only briefly. 8 0 Markham 
is taken to task for this by Walter Adams, who emphasizes " the crucial 
E. C. Knight decis ion." 8 1 In a more recent study of the Sugar Trust, 
Alfred Eichner also stresses the influence of this case . 8 2 
Hans Thorelli, in a book-length study of turn-of-the-century antitrust 
policy also published in 1955 rejects the view that antitrust may have done 
more than stimulate a few mergers, claiming that the probability of prose-
cution was too low. "It would be a vast exaggeration to say that the two 
railroad cases were a decisive factor in inducing restriction-minded busi-
nessmen to choose tight rather than loose combinations," he concludes. 8 3 
Ralph Nelson, author of an NBER study that provides an authoritative 
compilation and analysis of U.S. merger statistics, also looks at antitrust 
7 7 Jones , supra note 43 , at 29 -38 ; and Thorelli, supra note 14, at 83. 2 Victor S. Clark, 
History of Manufactures in the United States, 1860-1914 (1928), at 284, mentions several 
mergers in the 1880s in iron and steel. In addition, the holding company played a role only 
after the merger wave got underway. Haney, supra note 32, at 238, says that "just prior to 
the great holding company epoch which began in 1899 and reached its climax between that 
date and 1904, a number of consolidations of a different type arose—complete consolida-
t i o n s / ' Jones , supra note 43, at 31 , makes a similar claim. See also Thorelli, supra note 14, 
at 258. 
7 8 Haney , supra note at 32, at 205. Posner & Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 411, mention 
that Standard Oil assumed the form of a community of interest following its dissolution in 
1911. 
7 9 Markham, supra note 39. 
8 0 Id. at 166. 
8 1 Walter A d a m s , Comment , in Business Concentration and Price Policy: A Report of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research 182, 189-90 (1955). 
8 2 Eichner, supra note 16, at 186-87. 
8 3 Thorelli , supra note 14, at 258-59. Thorelli makes his view unmistakable in a footnote 
where he mentions Charles Washburn ' s claim that " t h e anti-trust legislation made the 
t r u s t s . " Thorelli responds that " th is is not a paradox but an absurdi ty ." Id. at 259, n.77. The 
most remarkable part of Washburn ' s article is part of an opinion given by Senator George F. 
Hoar , a coauthor of the Sherman Act, concerning a proposed pooling arrangement. This 
opinion was solicited in 1891 by the members of a pool to determine whether it would be in 
violation of the new antitrust law. It may be surprising to the modern reader to discover that 
the senator thought that a pool established as a defense against "des t ruct ive competi t ion 1 ' 
would not be illegal. See Charles G. Washburn, The History of a Statute , 8 B. U. L. Rev. 95, 
101 (1928). 
110 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
policy but finds the timing of the late 1890s mergers to be ambiguous. 8 4 In 
addition, Nelson contends that the 1888-92 mergers could not be ex-
plained by the later cases. As I have tried to show, the timing of the 
mergers is actually fairly consistent, and the earlier mergers occurred 
when the trusts first felt an ill wind. 
VII. AN ECONOMETRIC STUDY OF ANTITRUST POLICY AND MERGERS 
There were several swings in merger and cartel policy following the 
1904 Northern Securities decision. Standard Oil and American Tobacco 
were broken up, and tougher antitrust standards were written into the 
Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. The Taft and Wilson ad-
ministrations, during which these two pieces of legislation were consid-
ered and passed, had a particularly strong antimerger policy. This is 
reflected in the large number of "monopolization" cases filed in the years 
1910-14. 8 5 
At other times antitrust was more of a paper tiger. The government 
tried but failed to break up U.S. Steel, and merger policy was very lax in 
the 1920s. The per se rule against price fixing was scuttled in 1911 in 
Standard Oil and not firmly reestablished until 1927 in Trenton Pot-
teries*6 Throughout the intervening years, cases involving trade associa-
tions added to the uncertainty about what the Sherman Act did and did 
not prohibit. 8 7 Strenuous efforts were made during Theodore Roosevelt 's 
second term, in the years before the Clayton Act was passed, and in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s to rewrite the antitrust laws to allow at least 
regulated price fixing.88 This end was briefly achieved with the National Re-
covery Act cartelizations. Even the Supreme Court's resolve sagged in Appa-
lachian Coals}9 Finally, the Roosevelt administration reversed its course 
and adopted a stringent antitrust policy in the late 1930s and early 1940s. 
8 4 Nelson, supra note 40, at 135. Nelson is also inclined to interpret the British merge r 
wave as evidence that U.S. antitrust policy did not cause the U.S . mergers . 
8 5 Posner, supra note 36, at 398. 
8 6 Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); and United States v. Trenton Pot-
teries, 273 U .S . 392 (1927). See the commentary in Posner & Easterbrook, supra no te 3, a t 
114. 
8 7 Tippets & Livermore, supra note 72, at 297-310, review this development. They credi t 
Arthur J. Eddy, The New Competition (1911), with stimulating the formation of t hese 
associations, which were known until the 1920s as open price associations. Posner, supra 
note 36, at 398, reports a sharp increase in the number of trade association and information 
exchange cases for the years 1920-24. 
8 8 See J. D. Clark, The Federal Antitrust Policy (1931), chs. 6 -11 ; and Robert F . H immel -
berg, The Origins of the National Recovery Administration (1976). 
8 9 Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). 
9 0 Ellis W. Hawley , The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly (1966). 
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FIRM DISAPPEARANCES 1.208 
1895 1950 f * 
FIGURE 1.—Antitrust cases instituted by the Justice Department and merger activity, 1887— 
1950. (Ant i t rus t c a se s instituted by the Department of Justice are from Richard A. Posner, A 
S t a t i s t i c a l S tudy of Ant i t rus t Enforcement , 13 J. Law & Econ. 365, 366 (1970). Mergers, 
1 8 8 7 - 1 9 0 4 , c o m e from Jes se W. Markham, Survey of the Evidence and Findings on Merg-
e r s , in Bus ines s Concent ra t ion and Price Policy 141, 149 (1955). Firm disappearances, 1895-
1970 a n d 1919-1950, are from Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry, 
1 8 9 5 - 1 9 5 6 (1959), Table C-7 at 164-169.) 
Figure 1 shows the number of antitrust cases instituted by the Depart-
m e n t of Justice for the years 1890-1950. It also shows several merger 
ser ies that jointly cover the same period. The number of cases is a poor 
m e a s u r e of antitrust policy, in part because this aggregate lumps together 
p r ice fixing and other types of cases. But we have to make do. Important 
deve lopments for antitrust, which should also have an effect on merger, 
a r e marked below the graph. 
Beginning in 1904 and up to the late 1940s, there seems to have been a 
connec t ion between the two series. This covers the period between 
Northern Securities and the Cellar-Kefauver Amendment. Between 1904 
and the early 1920s there are four cycles of antitrust enforcement matched 
b y four cycles of merger activity. The first ended in 1908, when the 
H e p b u r n Bill—a legislative proposal that would have allowed price 
fixing—was being considered. That effort failed, and mergers increased 
sharply and then decreased during the years that reform of the antitrust 
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laws was being considered again, hitting their lowest point for the years 
1900-1920 in 1914, when the legislative labor gave birth to the FTC and 
Clayton Acts. The third and fourth cycles are really one, interrupted by 
the First World War, when industry was cartelized by government. 
One feature of this data, confirmed below in econometric results, is the 
tendency for changes in merger activity to lead changes in case filings. 
This can mean either that merger caused more cases to be filed or that 
case filings represented earlier changes in policy. Although yearly data on 
the number of merger and price-fixing cases are not available, five-year 
averages of charges filed from 1904 through 1925 indicate that only 18 
percent of all cases involved monopolization charges, while 71 percent 
involved horizontal agreements. 9 1 Note also that the number of cases filed 
underwent fairly dramatic swings, making it unlikely that budget cutbacks 
due to business cycles or other extraneous factors caused the periodic 
declines in case filings if the Department of Justice operated under 
roughly constant returns to scale. 
The 1920s merger wave is usually considered to be the second impor-
tant one after the 1898-1902 movement. The actual "wave" can probably 
be dated at 1925-29. Carl Eis emphasizes the lax merger policies in his 
study of these mergers. 9 2 This is consistent with the evidence from the 
earlier merger wave, but the two periods may have had an increasingly 
stringent cartel policy in common as well. Not only did the Supreme 
Court reestablish the per se rule in 1927 in Trenton Potteries, but the 
number of horizontal conspiracy cases filed in 1920-24 (fifty cases) and 
1925-29 (thirty-six cases) was greater than in all preceding five-year pe-
riods except 1910-14. It was also greater than in the next two five-year 
periods. 9 3 A renewed effort to change the antitrust laws followed the 1927 
case, and case filings also decreased. The number of mergers decreased at 
the same time, remaining low through the first two terms of the Roosevelt 
administration. However, case filings increased substantially in the late 
1930s and early 1940s, and the number of mergers increased directly after 
this 180 degree change in policy. This sort of graph reading certainly does 
not prove a connection, but it does provide the outlines of one explana-
tion for large swings in merger activity before passage of the Cellar-
Kefauver Amendment and before price fixing had become illegal perma-
nently and beyond all doubt. 
9 1 Posner, supra note 36, at 398. 
9 2 Carl Eis, The 1919-1930 Merger Movement in American Industry, 12 J. Law & E c o n . 
267, 284-92 (1969). 
9 3 Posner, supra note 36, at 398. Himmelberg, supra note 88, at 54-57, a rgues t h a t 
Republican policy in the mid-1920s, although lenient toward trade association act ivi t ies , w a s 
severe with regard to out-and-out price fixing. 
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Some statistical results support the likelihood of a link between mergers 
and case filings. In the results that follow yearly merger activity for the 
years 1895-1920 is regressed on case filings, stock price changes, and 
dummy variables covering periods where antitrust policy underwent 
changes. Stock price changes are included because the weak statistical 
association between stock prices and merger is one explanation— 
although an explanation without a theory—that has often been proposed 
as a cause of cycles in merger activity. The dummy variables are a neces-
sary evil because they are the only way of taking into account the key 
policy changes. The problem with using dummies, of course, is that the 
data are made up, so to speak, and given enough dummies, it would be 
possible to explain just about any time series. I will define three: one for 
1898-1902 (the period between Trans-Missouri and the initiation of 
Northern Securities)', 1899 (the year following Joint Traffic and the Ad-
dyston Court of Appeals decision); and 1896 and 1908-16 (the period 
covering the Hepburn Bill, the "monopolization" prosecutions of the 
Taft administration, the FTC and Clayton Acts, and the creation of ex-
empt industries, as well as the 1896 political uncertainty). 
The most striking feature of Table 6 is that the dummy variables for 
1898 and 1898-1902 provide strong and consistent support for the view 
that those years were special, even taking into account the influence of 
stock prices. The dummy for policy uncertainty (1896, 1908-16), on the 
other hand, shows a strong negative effect. Also of interest, the number of 
antitrust cases has as much explanatory power as stock returns. Current 
stock returns are more strongly related than either lagged or leading stock 
returns. In contrast, antitrust cases from past years are negatively related 
and from future years positively related to merger. Since case filings 
represent policy initiatives that had their origins before a given case was 
filed, the negative association of earlier case filings with current mergers 
suggests at first glance the perverse inference that mergers in the current 
period are stimulated by a lax price-fixing policy initiated more than a 
year ago. This is probably a statistical fluke that comes from the see-saw 
nature of antitrust enforcement. The positive association of next year's 
case filings with current merger activity comes closer to capturing an 
intelligible relationship since it takes time to prepare cases and since an 
administration will usually reveal before case filings are made what its 
stance on antitrust issues will b e . 9 4 
9 4 My resul t s contrast with those of Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Maintaining Economic Com-
peti t ion: T h e Causes and Consequences of Antitrust, 41 J. Pol. 169 (1979), who finds no 
relat ion b e t w e e n anti trust enforcement and mergers. He uses Depar tment of Justice case 
filings as the dependen t variable and mergers as the independent variable to assess whether 
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The last two columns of Table 6 show that when filings are used as 
explanatory variables the effect that can be credited to stock returns falls 
off. My guess about this is that stock prices partly changed in response to 
developments in antitrust. The Dow-Jones average used in these regres-
sions was composed chiefly of railroad stocks and stocks of corporations 
that had been formed in the 1898-1902 merger wave, and these are pre-
cisely the firms that had an interest in the interpretation and enforcement 
of the Sherman Act. As each of several crises in antitrust policy came and 
went (the years 1904, 1908, and 1914 provide examples), stock prices may 
have dropped and then risen as it became clear that more radical solutions 
to the trust problem—such as dissolution of firms that happened also to 
b e in the Dow-Jones index—were being passed up in favor of renewed 
dedication to catching price fixers.95 Similar arguments would hold for 
more broadly defined indexes, since a large fraction of industrial stocks 
were issued by firms formed in the Great Merger Wave. 
The results so far have used firm disappearances through merger in 
mining and manufacturing as the dependent variable. Examination of the 
data revealed that mining disappearances, chiefly in coal mining, ac-
counted for a large fraction of disappearances (17 percent for the years 
1895-1920) and were very variable. For example, they accounted for 43 
percent of the total in 1905. In addition, it seemed desirable to break down 
the regressions by the two types of merger, consolidation and acquisition. 
The regression results in Table 7 show an even weaker effect of stock 
returns on manufacturing disappearances than on manufacturing and min-
ing disappearances. They also show a much stronger relation between 
antitrust case filings and acquisition than between antitrust case filings 
and consolidation. On the other hand, consolidation seems largely to have 
been a response to events in 1898-1902 and does not appear to have been 
affected at all by the periods of "policy uncertainty" (1896, 1908-16) or 
by case filings. One possibility is that acquisition was more sensitive to 
the antitrust climate, but it seems more likely that the large number of 
consolidations in the years 1898-1902 imparted so much variability to the 
data over those years that the more subtle effects of case filings and the 
periods of policy uncertainty are lost. 
1895-1973. This raises the question why increased merger activity should cause more price-
fixing c a s e s to be filed if mergers and price fixing are substi tutes. In addition, Lewis-Beck 
u s e s one regression equation for the entire period, uses no trend or trendlike variable, and 
m a k e s no a t tempt to incorporate the possible effects of court cases. 
9 5 F r o m the Wall Street Journal , January 6, 1909, at 8, it can be established that six of the 
twe lve industr ials in the Dow Jones index are in a list of consolidations in Thorelli , supra 
n o t e 14, at 294-303 . A study based on stock market data by Malcom R. Burns, The Competi-
t ive Effects of Trust-Busting: A Portfolio Analysis, 85 J. Pol . Econ . 717 (1977), finds that the 
d isso lu t ion ordered for Standard Oil was not as severe as expected. 
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T A B L E 7 
REGRESSIONS OF MANUFACTURING FIRMS DISAPPEARANCES BROKEN DOWN BY CONSOLIDATIONS 
AND ACQUISITION, 1896-1920 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MANUFACTURING DISAPPEARANCES BY: 
VARIABLE 
Consolidation 
and Acquisition Consolidation Only Acquisition Only 
Constant 86.5 37.47 49.08 
(6.88) (3.95 (5.14) 
Stock return t - 8 . 7 8 8.09 - 1 6 . 8 7 
(.17) (.20) (.42) 
Antitrust cases / + 1 2.49 .23 2.26 
(2.78) (.33) (3.33) 
Dummy, 1899 696.0 646.7 49.33 
(21.33) (26.31) (1.99) 
Dummy, 1898-1902 198.4 198.1 .29 
(9.82) (13.03) (.19) 
Dummy, 1896-97 -52 .71 - 9 . 2 0 - 4 3 . 5 1 
and 1908-16 (4.00) (.93) (4.35) 
R2 .982 .989 .619 
D-W 1.98 2.43 1.36 
N 25 25 25 
SOURCE.—Same as Table 6. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Did antitrust policy cause the merger wave that began in the late 1890s? 
An assessment of what the key court decisions said and how they were 
interpreted makes it reasonable to suppose that merger was legal while 
cartels were not. This was at least a widespread view, and these decisions 
(Knight, Trans-Missouri, Joint Traffic, and Taffs Addyston opinion) en-
joyed prominent play in newspapers and legal publications. 
The timing of the mergers is consistent with this story. There was a 
brief flurry of mergers in the late 1880s—around the time the first antitrust 
laws were passed and the trusts were first brought into the courts. There 
was another increase after E. C. Knight, and finally an unprecedented 
number of mergers in 1898 following a new outcry against the trusts and a 
series of court cases that held price fixing to be illegal. Merger activity 
decreased substantially while Northern Securities was litigated. 
Other evidence comes from particular industries. The mergers in sev-
eral industries—cotton oil, sugar, cast iron pipe, oil, and meat packing— 
appear to have been the result of antitrust action taken against cartels in 
those industries. In other cases—shoe machinery and explosives— 
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merger was apparently undertaken on the advice of attorneys worried 
about the antitrust laws. Steel and railroading, two heavily cartelized 
industries, resorted to merger at a substantially greater pace beginning in 
1898, and a major promoter of consolidations claimed that the antitrust 
laws increased the number of U.S. mergers. In addition to merger, an-
other device, the community of interest, seems also to have sprung up in 
the late 1890s in railroading as a substitute for cartel agreements. 
Data from later years suggest that antitrust policy continued to in-
fluence the number of mergers. Northern Securities resulted in fewer 
consolidations and more acquisitions. There is a strong, positive statisti-
cal relationship between merger and the number of antitrust case filings 
during the years 1904 to 1920, and a more casual investigation suggests 
that the merger wave of the late 1920s may have been related to increased 
case filings and the reestablishment of the per se rule, and that the merger 
wave of the 1940s may have been a response to the antimonopoly cam-
paign of 1939-42. 
Any explanation has to be evaluated against the alternatives. The merg-
ers grew so rapidly and encompassed so many different industries that it 
seems reasonable to look first at policy intervention—a change in corpo-
ration laws or a change in cartel policy, for example. The obvious 
difficulty with the corporation law argument is that the laws were changed 
a decade before the mergers took place. It also begs the question, Why 
was the law changed? It seems more reasonable, I think, that mergers in 
1898 and 1899 were caused by court cases decided in 1897 and 1898. While 
the British mergers of the 1880s and 1890s represent a challenge to this 
seemingly straightforward interpretation of the evidence, it seems defen-
sible at the very least to say that the U.S. merger movement was larger 
and more pronounced by a great enough margin to merit special attention. 
I have also tried to revive an old controversy that the evidence seems to 
invite. Were the cartels and mergers caused by the desire for monopoly or 
by the desire to prevent ruinous competition? Both explanations are con-
sistent with the notion that the 1898-1902 mergers were caused by the 
court cases of 1897 and 1898. However, many firms apparently preferred 
the less secure collusion of a cartel until the late 1890s, suggesting that the 
monopoly gains from merger may not have been very great. So it certainly 
seems worthwhile to consider explanations that do not posit monopoly 
gain as the reason for collusion and for merger induced by a law against 
price fixing. 
The view that collusion and merger were both responses to unavoidable 
market imperfections stemming from fixed costs has some advantages 
considered purely as theory, and it also receives some support from the 
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disproportionate representation of the iron and steel industry in the peak 
years of 1898-1902, as well as from the prominent cartelization, merger, 
and development of communities of interest in railroading. The implica-
tion, only thinly sketched here, that there can be too much competition is 
also in harmony with the view of turn-of-the-century businessmen and 
economists, which seems to me to be a happy result if it can be achieved 
on an economically defensible basis. But, while I hope to have aided in 
the rehabilitation of a way of looking at competition and monopoly, much 
remains to be done. 
